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 Investment Advice: the Statutory 
Remedy 
Keith Stanton 
This article considers a tort which has received remarkably little comment: that found in 
s 138D(2) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.  The tort creates a very 
important consumer remedy in cases of mis-selling of financial products by banks and 
investment advisers.  In tort terms it is a prime example of a modern form of breach of 
statutory duty.  It is a statutory strict liability remedy for pure economic loss.  The article 
will consider the features of the tort and how it operates in the context of other 
remedies: in particular, how the rules governing it influence concurrent claims brought in 
negligence. 
Introduction 
This paper will consider an aspect of the law concerning the professional liability of 
investment advisors.  It will evaluate both the features of the tort which is found in 
s 138D(2) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA)1 and the relationship 
of that tort to tortious and contractual negligence liability.2 
Investment advice is an area which diverges from traditional professional negligence law 
in a number of ways.  First, it features a tortious remedy which is heavily based on 
regulatory provisions.3  Secondly, the remedy is unusual in the area of professional 
liability law in being largely derived from European Union law.  Finally, because, 
alongside the familiar picture of concurrent professional liability for negligence in 
contract and tort, this tort adds a statutory strict liability tort which provides a remedy 
for pure economic losses. 
The s 138D(2) tort is an important element in the protection provided to those who 
obtain investment advice from independent advisers, banks or others.  It gives to a 
private person4 damaged by a breach of a rule5 contained in the Financial Conduct 
Authority’s (FCA’s) Handbook an express right to seek compensation for their losses.6  A 
                                                                
 
1  Prior to amendments made to the Act by the Financial Services Act 2012, the relevant provision was 
s 150 of the Act.  The origin of the provision is s 62 of the Financial Services Act 1986.  
2  I do not propose to consider issues of limitation of actions, although such issues do feature in a 
number of cases. 
3  Note that throughout this article I will refer to rules within the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA’s) 
Handbook.  After the first citation, I will simply refer to them by the Chapter and rule number.  Thus FCA 
Handbook, Conduct of Business Sourcebook (COBS), Chapter 2 Rule 1.1 will simply be referred to as COBS 
2.1.1R.  The R indicates that the provision has the status of a rule as opposed to being guidance (indicated by a 
G) or an evidential provision (E).  The abbreviations used are those used by the FCA within the Handbook as 
chapter headings.  The Handbook can be accessed at https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook.  Note that 
there are occasional references to sections of the Handbook (Conduct of Business (COB) and Insurance 
Conduct of Business) ICOB) which have been superseded.  
4  See post p xx for a discussion of the meaning of ‘private person.’ 
5  See ante n 3.  Note that s 138D(3) stipulates that: If rules made by the FCA so provide, sub-s (2) does 
not apply to a contravention of a specified provision of the rules.  The most important rules excluded from 
actionability are those contained in the Financial Conduct Authority  Handbook  ‘Principles for Businesses’ 
(PRIN) 2.1.1R.  See PRIN Sch 5.4.    
6  Section 138D(1) creates an equivalent rule in relation to rules made by the Prudential Regulation 
Authority.  The author knows of no case in which this provision has been invoked.    
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wide range of rules, many of which are consumer protection measures derived from EU 
requirements,7 fall within this provision and can thus give rise to a claim in tort.  For the 
purposes of this paper, I intend to concentrate on what has proved to be the tort’s major 
role in practice: claims against investment advisers who have recommended or sold 
financial products to private customers.8   
It seems likely that this tort will continue to be important.  Since its introduction in 
19869 it has provided a remedy for persons damaged by significant examples of mis-
selling of financial products.  The older cases feature the mis-selling of equity release 
schemes10 and private pensions to clients.11  In recent years there has been a spate of 
cases alleging mis-selling of interest rate hedging products.12  It seems likely that 
misadvising and mis-selling following from the recently introduced pension freedoms will 
provoke a further wave of litigation.  The substantial value of wealth that can be tied up 
in investments such as pension funds means that failures to advise properly may well 
result in disputes. 
The Features of the Statutory Tort 
Section 138D(2) states that:  
A contravention by an authorised person of a rule made by the FCA [the Financial 
Conduct Authority] is actionable at the suit of a private person who suffers loss as 
a result of the contravention, subject to the defences and other incidents applying 
to actions for breach of statutory duty. 
Section 138D(2) itself creates no single tort.   What it does is make actionable breach of 
a large number of detailed regulatory rules enacted in the FCA’s Handbook.13  Indirectly, 
the s creates a host of different tortious obligations. 
The provision creates a strict liability statutory tort which gives recovery for pure 
economic loss.14  The notion of a statutory tortious liability for pure economic loss is, for 
two reasons, not as surprising as it might seem at first sight.  First, it is not unique as 
there are other statutory provisions which produce the same result.15  Secondly, the 
s 138D(2) tort operates in a context in which there is usually a very close relationship 
between an investment adviser and client.  This is exactly the kind of proximate, akin to 
contractual, professional relationship which would lead to the tort of negligence imposing 
a duty of care in relation to pure economic loss under the Hedley Byrne principle.   
                                                                
7  For current purposes, the most important piece of EU legislation is the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID) European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/39/EC OJ 2004 L 145/1.  A 
revised version (MiFID 2: 2014/65/EU) has been adopted: see 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/isd/mifid2/index_en.htm.  It is now scheduled to be in force by 3 
January 2018.  It is not likely to have any impact on tort litigation under s 138D(2). 
8  Other areas of FCA rules which may give rise to claims under s 138D(2) concern: banking, insurance 
mediation, collective investments, distance selling, e-commerce, mortgage credit and consumer credit. 
9  See n 1 ante. 
10  Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1999] Lloyd’s Rep PN 496. 
11  Loosemore v Financial Concepts [2001] Lloyd’s Rep PN 235. 
12  Crestsign Ltd v NatWest & RBS, Grant Estates Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, MTR Bailey & Anr v 
Barclays Bank PLC, Thornbridge Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc, Titan Steel Wheels Limited v Royal Bank of Scotland 
plc.  
13  The closest analogy is the now reversed s 47(2) of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 which 
made regulations made under the Act actionable in tort. 
14  See further Keith Stanton, ‘Legislating for Economic Loss’, in TT Arvind and Jenny Steele (eds), Tort 
Law and the Legislature (Hart Publishing, 2013).  
15  For example, Competition Act 1998, s 47A. 
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The express references in the provision to it having ‘the incidents of the tort of breach of 
statutory duty’ mean that the statutory liability is classed by English law as tortious even 
though the circumstances which give rise to it commonly occur in a contractual context.   
The tortious characteristic may be of importance when third parties, such as 
beneficiaries of pensions or insurance policies, have an interest in a financial product16 or 
where recommendations have been made by an advisor outside of a contractual 
relationship with a view to achieving a sale.17  It also ensures that contributory 
negligence is available as a defence and has implications for calculation of damages and 
the running of limitation periods.18 
Putting technicalities to one side, s 138D(2) is a remedy which protects individuals who 
are mis-sold financial products.  The duty is not an absolute one: liability is not 
established simply on proof that the defendant caused damage.  But, it is strict because 
proof of negligence is not a necessary criterion for liability.  Criteria, such as ‘suitability’ 
are used to govern the issue.  As such, the law here is a close relation to the obligation 
in a sale of goods contract to supply goods of ‘satisfactory’ quality19 and of the Consumer 
Protection Act 1987’s requirement that products are not ‘defective.’20  Such criteria differ 
from negligence in that the critical issue is a consideration of the result (is the product 
‘suitable,’ ‘satisfactory,’ ‘defective’ or not?) rather than of the process that gave rise to 
that result (was reasonable care taken in the process?).21  The statutory obligation can 
also be a positive one (the adviser must supply certain information: ie provide a positive 
benefit) rather than the traditional negative approach of negligence which requires a 
person to take care to avoid causing damage (ie a loss) to a reasonably foreseeable 
person.  None of this means that the statutory tort cannot closely resemble negligence. 
 The process of crystallisation22 can bring them together. 
As is common in relation to statutory torts, this tort offers protection (albeit enhanced 
protection) in a defined set of circumstances.  It is not a comprehensive remedy: it 
covers a limited area.  The statutory wording means that recommendations to purchase 
a product are covered but general advice to adopt a particular investment strategy is 
not, unless such a recommendation has been made.  Similarly, tax and estate planning 
are outside of the statute unless recommendations are made to purchase or sell 
particular products as part of the strategy to be adopted.  As is the case with industrial 
safety legislation, a statutory model can provide a far more detailed prescription as to 
the conduct required.  But, on the other hand, negligence, as a general tort, can operate 
in areas which the statutory protection misses: for example, because of the restriction of 
the statutory remedy to ‘private persons’.23  The statutory tort coexists with the tort of 
negligence in this area: it has not succeeded in supplanting it.  From a professional 
liability standpoint, the existence of the statutory tort means that an investment advisor 
faces a trilogy of concurrent remedies if a defective recommendation to purchase a 
product is given to a private client.  The traditional duties to show reasonable care and 
skill in advising based on contract and tort are supplemented by a strict liability tortious 
duty which has different characteristics.   
                                                                
16  See, for example, Zaki v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 14 in which it is stated (at para 27) 
that the products were purchased ‘in part for succession purposes.’ 
17  Worthing v Lloyds Bank plc [2015] EWHC 2836. 
18  The extension of the limitation period permitted by Limitation Act 1980 s 14A only applies to actions 
alleging negligence. 
19  Consumer Rights Act 2015 s 9. 
20  Consumer Protection Act 1987 s 3. 
21  For example, no tort is committed if a product recommended is ‘suitable’ even though the procedure 
used to achieve that result was defective.  See post p. xx.  Conversely, a product can be ‘unsuitable’ 
irrespective of the fact that all reasonable care was taken in producing the recommendation. 
22  See post p. xx. 
23  See post pp. xx. 
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Poor investment advice is also an area in which a non-litigious remedy plays an 
important role.  The Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) offers a free dispute resolution 
service to private persons and some small businesses24 in relation to the actions of FCA 
‘authorised persons.’25  Successful complaints worth less than £150,000 are enforceable 
through the FOS jurisdiction.  In practice it is difficult to see why anyone who has a 
complaint which falls within the FOS jurisdiction would resort to litigation.  This means 
that s 138D(2) claims tend to centre on mis-selling and acquisition of investments where 
losses are in excess of the FOS limit of £150,000.  The cases therefore concentrate on 
major investments by high net worth individuals: the sale of interest rate hedging 
products, pensions mis-selling (where the capital value of the fund may often exceed the 
FOS limit), equity release plans and treatment of temporary high balances (such as the 
proceeds of property or business sales). 
One of the major problems presented by this area of law is its fragmented and 
inaccessible structure.  The apparent simplicity of s 138D(2) is undermined by the fact 
that the relevant rules, breach of which are made actionable by the provision, are 
scattered around the FCA’s Handbook and cover a wide range of issues, some of which 
are unlikely to cause the kind of damage to individuals that will result in a claim for 
compensation.  The range of Handbook rules breach of which are actionable under this 
provision is massive.  There is no paradigm of the tort.  The Handbook is too diverse in 
the subjects it covers to permit this.  However, two factors operate to limit the role of 
the tort.  First, it is only actionable by a ‘private person.’  Secondly, many breaches of 
rules which damage private persons are likely to have limited financial impact and thus 
be more suitable for resolution by FOS.   
Before considering the areas in which the tort has had the greatest impact it is necessary 
to consider the major limitation on its scope caused by the ‘private persons’ threshold.  
The ‘private person’ threshold 
Section 138D(2) states that only a ‘private person’ who suffers loss as a result of the 
contravention of rules can invoke it.  The result of this restriction is that the tort of 
negligence retains a major role in the many situations in which this condition is not 
satisfied.  The correct meaning of ‘private person’ has spawned litigation.  The definition 
is not simple.  The most important issue is the extent to which businesses are able to 
bring themselves within it. 
The definition of ‘private person’ is found in reg 3(1) of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (Rights of Action) Regulations 2001 (ROA).26    
 
In these Regulations, ’private person‘ means— 
(a)     any individual, unless he suffers the loss in question in the course of 
carrying on— 
(i)     any regulated activity; or 
(ii)    … 
(b)     any person who is not an individual, unless he suffers the loss in 
question in the course of carrying on business of any kind. 
 
Subregulation 1(a)(i) is non-problematic.  The exception ensures that individuals (such 
as independent financial advisers operating as sole traders) who are conducting 
regulated activities are excluded from the statutory protection when receiving advice 
                                                                
24  See post pp. xx. 
25  Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, Part XVI. Financial Conduct Authority  Handbook  Dispute 
Resolution: Complaints (DISP) 2.7.3R. 
26  SI 2001/2256. 
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from others in the industry.  However, the wording of paragraph (b) is more difficult as 
it opens the door to claims being brought under the s by businesses claiming that they 
were not conducting business activities at the time when they received the advice.  The 
provision was originally intended to permit charities to be protected in relation to advice 
received concerning their investments.27  However, it has been a fruitful source of 
litigation as trading businesses have sought to obtain the benefit of statutory protection.  
As a matter of statutory interpretation, this is a difficult argument to accept.  For 
example, it seems counterintuitive to say that a business is not indulging in business 
activities when arranging funding to support those activities.  In the case of a business 
trading in second hand vehicles, it is surely wrong to argue that advice on how the 
business should fund its stock is not part of carrying on the business.  It should be no 
different if that advice extends to recommending interest rate protection of its borrowing 
by means of a hedging product.  Equally, one would expect advice as to the business’s 
insurance or pension arrangements to be regarded as part of the business even though 
the product purchased may not be specifically related to cars.  If it is correct that the 
statutory protection is not owed on such facts, the claimant business may still be able to 
invoke a tortious or contractual claim for professional negligence.   
 
Attempts to bring businesses within the protection have generally been rejected when 
raised at first instance.  In Titan Steel Wheels Limited v The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc28 
it was argued that the company’s use of foreign exchange products for hedging against 
currency risks was incidental to its business because it did not trade in them.  However, 
this contention was rejected.  David Steele J held that the words ‘in the course of 
carrying on business of any kind’ should be given a wide reading and that, in any case, 
the frequency in which the company bought forward currency and the fact that it had 
regularly made profits on such transactions meant that such dealing would have counted 
as part of its business even if a narrower interpretation of those words had been 
preferred.  The result in Titan Steel Wheels was followed at first instance in MTR Bailey 
Trading Limited v Barclays Bank PLC.29  In that case the company argued unsuccessfully 
that its business was to deal in vehicles and property and not in financial instruments 
and thus that its acquisition of a swap did not occur in the course of its business and 
that it was therefore a private person and entitled to invoke s 138D(2).   
 
However, the issue cannot be regarded as closed as the first instance results were 
questioned when the Court of Appeal permitted the claimant company to appeal the 
point in Bailey on the basis that its case was arguable.  It is suggested that when an 
appeal court addresses the issue, the approach in Titan is the correct interpretation of 
the legislation.  However, there are two additional points to be considered. 
 
First, it must be emphasised that the distinction between private and a non-private 
person for actionability purposes is not identical to the MiFID derived retail/professional 
client distinction30 used within the FCA handbook to define the level of protection which a 
firm must offer to different categories of client.  The great majority of individual 
investors will be both ‘private persons’ under the ROA and classified as ‘retail’ clients by 
the FCA.31  However, individuals have a right to ask to be classified as ‘elective 
professional clients’ and firms can permit this reclassification if specified conditions are 
satisfied.32  Such a reclassification does not, however, remove that individual’s right of 
action as a private client under s 138D, although it makes it more likely that the client is 
                                                                
27  The history of the provision is set out by David Steele J in Titan Steel Wheels Limited v The Royal Bank 
of Scotland Plc [2010] EWHC 211 (Comm) at paras 52 to 60. 
28  [2010] EWHC 211 (Comm). 
29  [2015] EWCA Civ 667.  See also the decision of the Outer House of the Court of Session in Grant 
Estates Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland PLC [2012] CSOH 133. 
30  This categorisation is derived from MiFID. 
31  COBS 3.4. 
32  COBS 3.5.3. 
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receiving a non-advised service (ie one where they make their own decisions rather than 
receiving recommendations as to what to purchase).  Conversely, many businesses fail 
to satisfy the definition of a ‘per se professional’ client33 in the FCA Handbook’s Conduct 
of Business Sourcebook (COBS) and, as anyone who fails to do that is automatically 
deemed a ‘retail’ client,34 they are retail clients but not private persons and therefore 
receive additional protection under FCA rules but, do not have a right to claim under the 
statutory tort.  Such complexity is difficult to justify. 
 
Secondly, whatever the correct interpretation of the existing rule, it is arguable that 
some businesses ought to be brought within the protection of s 138D(2).  For example, 
recently reported litigation has shown that some businesses have been sold 
exceptionally complex hedging products which had features which were only understood 
fully by highly specialised bankers.  There is therefore an argument that these 
businesses were entering contracts in a position of such inequality of skill and knowledge 
that they ought to have access to the statutory tort remedy.35  Indeed, when the FCA 
conducted its review of Interest Rate Hedging products, it used the term ‘unsophisticated 
customers’ in order to bring both ‘private customers’ and ‘retail clients’ within the scope 
of its work.36  The redress scheme set up as a consequence of the review has paid 
compensation to 18,200 businesses.37 
 
There is a discernible trend towards extending consumer protection rights beyond 
individuals.  For example, the government has been consulting on whether to extend the 
consumer level of sale of goods protection to small businesses.38  The Financial 
Ombudsman Services’s jurisdiction is open to ‘micro-enterprises’ ie businesses which 
have an annual turnover of up to two million euros and fewer than ten employees.39  The 
result is that, if the Titan Steel Wheels result is upheld, the threshold for accessing s 
138D(2) will be much higher than that for taking a claim to FOS.  Furthermore, as we 
have already seen, COBS uses definitions of ‘per se professional clients’40 which permit 
substantial businesses to receive the enhanced protection afforded to retail clients, even 
though they are denied tort rights. 
 
It is arguable that the law would be simpler and fairer if all ‘retail clients,’ as defined by 
MiFID, were protected by s 138D(2).  An attempt to achieve that result by challenging 
the ‘private persons’ restriction on the ground that it breached EU law was unsuccessful 
in the Outer House of the Court of Session in Grant Estates Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland 
Plc on the grounds that MiFID does not prescribe the enforcement mechanism to be used 
by member states.41  This result is arguably the correct result as an interpretation of the 
current law, but is not ideal as a matter of policy. 
 
 
Obligations owed 
 
                                                                
33  COBS 3.5.2. 
34  COBS 3.4.  Unless they establish a case of being an ‘elective professional client’ under COBS 3.5.3. 
35  See, G McMeel, ‘The Impact of Exemption Clauses and Disclaimers: Construction, Contractual 
Estoppel and Public Policy’, in A Dyson, J Goudkamp and F Wilmot-Smith (eds), Defences in Contract (2017) 
239. 
36  See https://www.fca.org.uk/consumers/interest-rate-hedging-products. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Protection of Small Businesses when Purchasing 
Goods and Services: Government Response to the Call for Evidence, February 2016.  
39  Financial Conduct Authority  Handbook , Dispute Resolution: Complaints (DISP) 2.7.3.  
40  COBS 3.5.2. 
41  [2012] CSOH 133. 
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As has already been said, COBS enacts a wide range of obligations which are capable of 
giving rise to a damages remedy under s 138D(2).  These range across such matters as 
ensuring that recommendations of investments are ‘suitable’ for the client,42 acting in 
the client’s best interests,43 communications with clients,44 financial promotions,45 and 
record keeping.46   
 
These provisions are supported by a widely worded ban on attempts to exclude or 
restrict their operation. 
COBS 2.1.2R states that: 
 
A firm must not, in any communication relating to designated investment 
business seek to: 
(1) exclude or restrict; or 
(2) rely on any exclusion or restriction of; 
any duty or liability it may have to a client under the regulatory system. 47 
 
For the purposes of this article, I propose to concentrate on those areas which have been 
at the forefront of litigation brought under s 138D(2): the ‘best interests’ rule; failing to 
give a customer proper information about the characteristics of and the risks inherent in 
a product and recommending a product which is unsuitable for a customer. 
 
Best interests 
 
COBS 2.1 establishes the client’s ‘best interests’ rule.48  COBS 2.1.1R(1), breach of 
which is actionable in tort, states that:  
 
A firm must act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best 
interests of its client.49  
 
Although this rule is widely worded, it leaves a claimant with a substantial burden of 
proof in having to prove dishonesty, unfairness or a lack of professionalism. 
 
The rule applies only to ‘designated investment business’50  As a result, it does not apply 
to a bank which sells a savings account or a mortgage to a customer.  There is therefore 
no obligation on a bank, for example, to advise a customer that a better rate of interest 
could be obtained from a rival firm.  Caveat emptor is not overridden in such 
circumstances. 
 
This rule has been little used.  In MTR Bailey Trading Limited v Barclays Bank plc51 it was 
argued that a bank had breached it by requiring a customer to transfer a 
disadvantageous swaps contract to an associated company.  At first instance, HH Judge 
                                                                
42  COBS 9.2R.  Zaki v Credit Suisse (UK) Limited [2013] EWCA Civ 14, Rubenstein v HSBC Bank PLC [2012] 
EWCA Civ 1184. 
43  COBS 2.1R. 
44  COBS 2.2.1R. Rubenstein v HSBC Bank PLC [2012] EWCA Civ 1184.  
45  COBS 4.3R. 
46  COBS 3.8R.  Rubenstein v HSBC Bank PLC [2012] EWCA Civ 1184. 
47  See further McMeel (supra n 34). 
48  Implementing Article 19(1) of MiFID and Article 14(1)(a) and (b) of the Undertakings for Collective 
Investment inTransferable Securities (UCITS) Directive, European Parliament and Council Directive 2009/65/EC 
OJ 2009 L 302/32. 
49  In relation to MiFID business it protects all clients.  For non-MiFID business only retail clients are 
protected. 
50  COBS 1.1.1R(2). 
51  [2014] EWHC 2882 (QB). 
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Keyser QC held that a mere mistake by a bank as to its contractual rights would not 
constitute a lack of professionalism, honesty and fairness such as would establish a 
breach of the best interests rule.52  However, the Court of Appeal subsequently 
permitted the claimant to appeal this decision on the grounds that the company’s claim 
was arguable.53  It is submitted that the interpretation given at first instance is correct. 
 
Provision of information 
 
A number of important rules govern the information which must be given to a client.  
Under the terms of s 138D(2) breach of these rules is actionable by a private person if 
they have suffered loss as a consequence of the breach. 
 
Information disclosure before providing services 
 
COBS 2.2.1R provides for the information which must be disclosed before services are 
provided to a client. 
 
(1)  A firm must provide appropriate information in a comprehensible form to 
a client about: 
(a) the firm and its services; 
(b) designated investments and proposed investment strategies; including 
appropriate guidance on and warnings of the risks associated with investments 
in those designated investments or in respect of particular investment 
strategies; 
(c) execution venues; and 
(d) costs and associated charges; 
so that the client is reasonably able to understand the nature and risks of the 
service and of the specific type of designated investment that is being offered and, 
consequently, to take investment decisions on an informed basis. 
(2) That information may be provided in a standardised format. 
This is a positive obligation to provide general information which goes considerably 
further than the equivalent common law obligation not to provide misleading 
information.54  The rule does not simply create a formal obligation to provide information 
as to the firm and its charges.  It goes further because of the obligation to provide 
information as to the risks inherent in the designated investments or the investment 
strategy being proposed.   On the other hand, such introductory information can be 
supplied in a standardised form and an adviser who supplies appropriate information is 
entitled to assume that an intelligent and educated client will read and understand it.55   
 
Communications with clients 
 
Once the client relationship is established, more detailed rules need to be satisfied.  Of 
central importance is the ‘fair, clear and not misleading’ rule laid down by COBS 4.2.1R: 
 
(1) A firm must ensure that a communication or a financial promotion is fair, clear 
and not misleading. 
(2) This rule applies in relation to: 
(a)  a communication by the firm to a client in relation to designated 
investment business other than a third party prospectus; 
(b)  a financial promotion communicated by the firm that is not: 
                                                                
52  [2014] EWHC 2882 (QB). 
53  [2015] EWCA Civ 667. 
54  Green & Rowley v The Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2013] EWCA Civ 1197, para 17.  
55  Al Sulaiman v Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd [2013] EWHC 400, para 154. 
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(i) an excluded communication; 
(ii) a non-retail communication; 
(iii) a third party prospectus; and 
(c)  a financial promotion approved by the firm. 
 
This rule does more than simply require provision of information and warnings as to 
risks.  The requirement to ensure that information is not ‘misleading’ effectively creates 
a statutory remedy for misrepresentation.  In Rubenstein v HSBC Bank PLC56 it was held 
that advice that an investment was as ‘safe as cash’ when it was actually equity based 
was actionable.57  An equivalent provision in the Insurance Conduct of Business 
sourcebook (ICOB)58 was held to have been infringed in Figurasin v Central Capital Ltd59 
when a sales person failed to make clear to a prospective client that the sum quoted as 
the cost of a loan included a substantial PPI premium.  Guidance contained in COBS 
4.2.2G is to the effect that the rule should be applied proportionately with the result that 
more may be expected in a communication to a retail client than in one to a professional 
one. 
 
In contrast with COBS 2.2.1R, tort claims brought for a breach of COBS 4.2.1R are 
dependent on proof of negligence as a firm has a defence if reasonable steps have been 
taken to ensure compliance.  COBS 4.2.6 provides: 
If, in relation to a particular communication or financial promotion, a firm takes 
reasonable steps to ensure it complies with the fair, clear and not misleading rule, 
a contravention of that rule does not give rise to a right of action under s 138D(2) 
of the Act. 
 
A further anti-misrepresentation provision operates in relation to information concerning 
investment business that is likely to be received by a retail client.60  This is an example 
of an increased level of protection being given to retail, but not professional clients. The 
provision aims to ensure that a retail customer is given a balanced picture of the 
advantages and possible risks of a proposed investment.  COBS 4.5.2R provides that: 
A firm must ensure that information: 
(1)  includes the name of the firm; 
(2)  is accurate and in particular does not emphasise any potential benefits 
of relevant business or a relevant investment without also giving a fair and 
prominent indication of any relevant risks; 
(3)  is sufficient for, and presented in a way that is likely to be understood by, 
the average member of the group to whom it is directed, or by whom it is likely 
to be received; and 
(4)  does not disguise, diminish or obscure important items, statements or 
warnings. 
Given that the wording of this rule is drafted in terms designed to ensure that balanced 
information is provided to a retail customer, it is not surprising that it is not qualified by 
                                                                
56  [2011] EWHC 2304 (QB).  Per HH Judge Havelock-Allen QC.  This finding, which was based on the older 
version of the rule (COB 2.1.3R) was not appealed. 
57  Cf Worthing v Lloyds Bank plc [2015] EWHC 2836, para 63.  
58  Financial Conduct Authority  Handbook, Insurance: Conduct of Business, ICOB 2.2.3(1)R.  The current 
provision is Financial Conduct Authority  Handbook , Insurance: Conduct of Business Sourcebook (ICOBS) 
2.2.2R. 
59  [2014] EWCA Civ 504.   
60  Defined by COBS 3.4.1R as a ‘retail client is a client who is not a professional client or an eligible 
counterparty.’ 
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a criterion of reasonableness.  There are supplementary rules concerning the provision of 
information comparing products and businesses61 and the tax treatment of products.62 
Suitability 
 
In terms of litigation the most commonly invoked rights created by the FCA Handbook 
are those contained within chapter 9.2 of COBS.  These place a ‘suitability’ requirement 
on a firm which makes a personal recommendation in relation to a designated 
investment63 and on a firm which manages investments on behalf of clients.64  For these 
purposes ‘recommendation’ is defined as ‘advice on investments.’65  The rule therefore 
relies upon the distinction between advisory work and non-advised sales which is central 
to this area of law.66  A sale of a product which is not based on an advisory or 
management function is not subject to the suitability requirement.  Neither is general 
advice as to the investment, tax or estate planning strategy to be pursued, unless 
specific products are recommended.67  Such transactions will be governed by principles 
of caveat emptor and the general law of negligence.  This distinction is of particular 
importance for banks as they commonly offer both kinds of service to their customers.68 
 In Rubenstein v HSBC Bank plc69 a banker mistakenly thought that he was not 
performing an advisory role and therefore did not undertake a customer fact find. 
 However, his assumption was held to have been mistaken and the failure resulted in the 
client acquiring an unsuitable product for which the bank was held liable.  The distinction 
is also important because retail banks have started to offer private customers online 
investment platforms on a non-advisory basis.70  The suitability requirement will not 
apply to investment products purchased in this way. 
 
Alleged breaches of this requirement have been the basis of the majority of reported 
cases brought under s 138D(2).71  COBS 9.2.1R72 provides: 
 
                                                                
61  COBS 4.5.6R. 
62  COBS 4.5.7R. 
63  COBS 9.1.1R.  See also the equivalent provisions in Financial Conduct Authority Handbook,  Insurance: 
Conduct of Business Sourcebook (ICOBS) 5.3.1R (Insurance) and Financial Conduct Authority  Handbook,  
Mortgages and Home Finance: Conduct of Business Sourcebook (MCOB) 4.7A.2R (Mortgage advice). 
64  COBS 9.1.3R. 
65  Financial Conduct Authority  Handbook, Consumer Redress Schemes Sourcebook, Appendix (CONRED 
APP) 1.1.  The distinction between giving advice and giving information is set out in Financial Conduct 
Authority  Handbook, The Perimeter Guidance Manual (PERG) 2.7.15G. 
66  In the context of negligence, see JP Morgan Chase Bank v Springwell Navigation Corporation [2008] 
EWHC 1186 (Comm) para 108, per Gloster J.  
67  See, generally, PERG 2.7.15G. 
68  Negotiations between bank and customer can lead to it being unclear whether staff were simply 
giving information or were advising the customer.  The response of banks has been to use contractual terms 
which state explicitly that advice has not been given and that customers should seek independent advice if 
they have concerns about the transaction they are entering.  In practice, such terms have tended to be 
effective.  The normal approach, as seen in Crestsign Ltd v National Westminster Bank PLC [2014] EWHC 3043  
is to regard such terms as a ‘basis’ clause: ie as a term which determines the scope of the bank’s contractual 
obligation.  In the alternative, when the term has been classified as an exclusion clause it may well satisfy the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 because it is held to be reasonable between the parties. Titan Steel Wheels 
Limited v The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2010] EWHC 211 (Comm).  The finding was obiter as the terms were 
held to have been a basis clause.  See generally, G McMeel, ante n 35. 
69  [2013] PNLR 9. 
70  See: for Barclays Bank https://www.smartinvestor.barclays.co.uk/important-information/what-is-
barclays-smart-investor.html; for NatWest http://www.natwest.com/personal/investments/g2/self-select.ashx 
71  And the predecessor provisions.  See ante n 1. 
72  Implementing Article 19(4) of MiFID and Article 12(2) of the Insurance Mediation Directive, 
2002/92/EC.  
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(1) A firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that a personal 
recommendation, or a decision to trade, is suitable for its client. 
(2) When making the personal recommendation or managing his investments, 
the firm must obtain the necessary information regarding the client's: 
(a) knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to the 
specific type of designated investment or service; 
(b) financial situation; and 
(c) investment objectives; 
so as to enable the firm to make the recommendation, or take the decision, which 
is suitable for him. 
 
The effect of the provision should be noted.  The required result is the purchase or sale 
of a product which is ‘suitable.’  If the advice given relates to a portfolio of investments, 
lack of diversity or high levels of leverage may establish unsuitability.73  The provision 
thus establishes a strict liability result: one which is unqualified by any criterion of 
negligence and which turns on the result achieved rather than the means employed to 
achieve the result.74  In Zaki v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd75 it was accepted that no 
actionable breach of this requirement would be established if a suitable product was 
recommended, even if procedural failings had occurred in the process leading to that 
recommendation.76 
 
The suitability of a product for a customer’s needs can only be judged in the light of a 
fact find relating to that customer.  In the words of Rix LJ ‘It may not be easy to give 
suitable advice: but it is harder to do so if one goes about it in the wrong way.’77  Rule 
9.2.2R78 makes it a requirement that such a fact find be conducted.79 
 
(1) A firm must obtain from the client such information as is necessary for 
the firm to understand the essential facts about him and have a reasonable basis 
for believing, giving due consideration to the nature and extent80 of the service 
provided, that the specific transaction to be recommended, or entered into in the 
course of managing: 
(a) meets his investment objectives; 
(b) is such that he is able financially to bear any related investment risks 
consistent with his investment objectives; and 
(c) is such that he has the necessary experience and knowledge in order 
to understand the risks involved in the transaction or in the management 
of his portfolio. 
(2) The information regarding the investment objectives of a client must include, 
where relevant, information on the length of time for which he wishes to hold the 
investment, his preferences regarding risk taking, his risk profile, and the 
purposes of the investment. 
                                                                
73  Zaki v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 14, para 129. 
74  Although it is not spelt out in the same way, this would appear to be a straight equivalent of the 
‘consumer expectation’ test which governs the definition of ‘defect’ in s 3 of the Consumer Protection Act 
1987. 
75  [2013] EWCA Civ 14, para 99.  See also, Basra Al Sulaiman v Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited 
[2013] EWHC 400 (Comm) para 19. 
76  But, those procedural failings might be actionable as a breach of the rules concerning provision of 
information or the customer fact find. 
77  Rubenstein v HSBC Bank plc [2013] PNLR 9, para 59. 
78  Implementing Articles 35(1), (3) and (4) of the MiFID implementing Directive. 
79  A failure to conduct such a fact find, resulting from a misapprehension that no advice was being given, 
was the basis of the finding of liability in Rubenstein v HSBC Bank plc [2013] PNLR 9. 
80  Excessive leverage may render a loan transaction ‘unsuitable.’  Zaki v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd [2013] 
EWCA Civ 14, para 89. 
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(3) The information regarding the financial situation of a client must include, 
where relevant, information on the source and extent of his regular income, his 
assets, including liquid assets, investments and real property, and his regular 
financial commitments. 
 
The obligation on the adviser under this provision is to obtain those facts which 
establish: a reasonable basis for believing that the transaction meets the client’s 
objectives; that the client has sufficient assets to bear any risks created by the 
investment and sufficient understanding to appreciate those risks.  The unsuccessful 
claim in Basra Al Sulaiman v Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited81 was based on an 
allegation that the claimant had not been given a sufficient understanding of the risks 
involved in purchasing and trading in leveraged structured notes.  
COBS 9.2.3R82 further provides that: 
The information regarding a client’s knowledge and experience in the investment 
field includes, to the extent appropriate to the nature of the client, the nature and 
extent of the service to be provided and the type of product or transaction 
envisaged, including their complexity and the risks involved, information on: 
(1) the types of service, transaction and designated investment with which 
the client is familiar; 
(2) the nature, volume, frequency of the client’s transactions in designated 
investments and the period over which they have been carried out; 
(3) the level of education, profession or relevant former profession of 
the client. 
 
Viewed as a piece of consumer protection legislation, the tort which emerges from these 
rules is a close relation to the implied terms of quality incorporated by statute into a sale 
of goods contract.83  Given the sums of money which may be involved in the sale of 
investments, pensions and insurance, it is not surprising that claims under these 
provisions are now a familiar part of modern tort law.  The leading case of Rubenstein v 
HSBC Bank plc84 is an example of liability based (inter alia) on a recommendation of an 
unsuitable investment given the client’s attitude to risk85 and on a failure by the adviser 
to conduct a fact find.  The claimant had wanted an investment equivalent to cash as the 
money being invested was the proceeds of a house sale that was intended to be used to 
purchase a new property.  The product sold in fact exposed the claimant to market 
movements and proved illiquid for a period during the 2008 crisis before it was finally 
sold at a loss.  In that case the failure to achieve suitability seems to have been based 
on the availability of a less risky product which was more suitable given the client’s 
clearly stated risk aversion in relation to this transaction.86  The older case of Seymour v 
Ockwell87 is a similar example, decided under s 62 of the Financial Services Act 1986, of 
a high risk and unsuitable product being recommended to customers who wanted no or 
minimal risk.  In both cases, liability was established both at common law in negligence 
and under the statute.   
 
However, the simple fact that an investment can be shown, with the benefits of 
hindsight, to have been a bad one does not necessarily mean that it was unsuitable at 
the time that it was made.  Cases such as Zaki v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd88 illustrate that 
                                                                
81  [2013] EWHC 400 (Comm). 
82  Implementing Article 37(1) of the MiFID Implementing Directive. 
83  Sections 9 and 10 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015. 
84  [2013] PNLR 9. 
85  It was a ‘packaged’ product and was not the most suitable one available to satisfy the client’s needs 
under the former COB 5.3.5R.  An equivalent rule does not exist in COBS.   
86  For more detail see [2013] PNLR 9, para 55. 
87  [2005] PNLR 39. 
88  [2013] EWCA Civ 14, para 99. 
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high risk investments may suitable for high net worth investors who understand the 
market and the risks they are taking in seeking high returns.  Such a result occurred in 
O’Hare v Coutts & Co.89  The client in that case was a very high net worth individual who 
was investing the proceeds of the sale of a business and who could afford to take risks in 
seeking a high return by means of wealth generation products.  The client had received a 
full explanation as to the risks involved in the investment in question.  Kerr J held that in 
these circumstances the investment was not unsuitable.   
 
The law in this area needs to strike a balance between the protection of those acquiring 
financial products and the expectation that such persons take responsibility for their own 
decisions.90  This is an area which features a classic professional scenario.  The 
customer’s actions and decisions are guided by the expertise of the advisor.  That 
expertise may well lead the customer into buying products of which they had not 
previously had knowledge and of which they have little detailed understanding.  
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, when setting out the objectives of the FCA, 
recognises the conflicting policies. Section 1C provides: 
  
(1)  The consumer protection objective is: securing an appropriate degree of 
protection for consumers. 
(2)  In considering what degree of protection for consumers may be 
appropriate, the FCA must have regard to— 
(a)  the differing degrees of risk involved in different kinds of investment or 
other transaction; 
(b)  the differing degrees of experience and expertise that different consumers 
may have; 
(c)  the needs that consumers may have for the timely provision of information 
and advice that is accurate and fit for purpose; 
(d)  the general principle that consumers should take responsibility for their 
decisions; 
(e)  the general principle that those providing regulated financial services 
should be expected to provide consumers with a level of care that is 
appropriate having regard to the degree of risk involved in relation to the 
investment or other transaction and the capabilities of the consumers in 
question; 
(f)  the differing expectations that consumers may have in relation to different 
kinds of investment or other transaction; 
(g)  …  
 
The FCA’s statutory objectives thus expressly recognise that a balance needs to be 
struck between the need to protect consumers and their taking responsibility for their 
own decisions.91  Financial markets can be volatile.  Investments can lose value even 
though they were suitable for the customer’s needs when acquired.  To succeed in a 
claim under s 138D(2) a claimant must prove that the advice given was unsuitable at the 
time it was offered.  Cases such as O’Hare support the contention that it is acceptable 
for a bank offering advice to induce a customer to purchase one of its products as long 
as that sale satisfies the ‘suitability’ criterion.92  It was there accepted that it is the role 
of a bank to sell products to customers and that there is nothing intrinsically wrong is 
                                                                
89  [2016] EWHC 2224 (QB).  Also Al Sulaiman v Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd [2013] EWHC 400. 
90  See the views of Rix LJ in Rubenstein v HSBC Bank [2013] PNLR 9, at paragraph 115 and Zaki v Crédit 
Suisse (UK) Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 14 at para 83. 
91  The claims made in a number of leading cases failed on the grounds that the investor was willing to 
take risks in pursuit of a high return: eg Zaki v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 14 and Al Sulaiman v 
Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd [2013] EWHC 400. 
92  Kerr J (para 217) uses the criterion of ‘foolhardy’ to indicate when the line is overstepped.  It is 
submitted that this cannot be correct.     
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using sales techniques to achieve that result.  It is the suitability test which governs 
whether the sale was wrongful.  Furthermore, advisers are employed to give the client 
the benefit of their expertise.  It may be perfectly proper for an adviser to advise the 
client to invest in a form of product which had not been previously considered.  An 
adviser’s role may be to tutor the client on investment opportunities which are suitable.  
The fact that they prove with hindsight not to have performed as expected does not 
mean that the advice was unsuitable when given.  As Kerr J said in O’Hare: 
In my judgment, the authorities do not exclude the proposition that in an 
appropriate case, advice from a private banker may condition the client’s risk 
appetite, rather than the other way round93  
and (in greater detail)  
a private banker may have a client whose untutored risk appetite (at a time of 
very low interest rates for cash investments) is so risk-averse that he would lose 
out on a bonanza of high returns unless advised about the virtues of equities 
during a time of sharply rising share prices.  In principle, an adviser who failed to 
advise the client to take more risk than he had hitherto taken, might even be 
negligent.94 
Advice means what it says.  The role is to provide the client with information on which a 
decision can be made. It is not to make the decision for the client.  Although the FCA 
rules create an obligation to review the customer’s affairs and attitude, so that the 
capacity and appetite for risk can be assessed and used when recommendations are 
made, it is ultimately for the client to make decisions based on the information put 
before them.  An investment adviser’s role is not that of an insurer against investments 
proving mistaken. 
 
Appropriateness (Complex instruments) 
Whereas COBS 9 creates the ‘suitability’ duty when financial products have been 
recommended or where clients’ investments are being managed, COBS 10, which is also 
derived from MiFID,95 creates a different level of duty when ‘complex products’96 have 
been chosen by a person who has received no advice or recommendation.  The aim of 
this provision is to create a level of protection for purchasers of products such as 
derivatives, options or swaps.  Purchases of shares, bonds and unit trusts are specifically 
excluded from this protection.  In a case falling within COBS 10, the firm conducting the 
trade is required to consider whether the purchase is ‘appropriate’ for the client97 and to 
warn if they believe that this is not the case.98   The ‘appropriate’ criterion requires the 
firm merely to inquire as to the client’s experience and knowledge of the form of 
investment being purchased.99  COBS 10 is thus significantly less demanding than the 
‘know your customer’ obligations imposed by COBS 9 in the case of advised sales as 
there is no need to inquire into the client’s means or investment objectives.   
Best execution 
                                                                
93  Para 218. 
94  Para 220. 
95  Article 19(5) of MiFID and Article 36 of the MiFID Implementing Directive. 
96  Defined by COBS 10.4. 
97  COBS 10.2.1R.  For exceptions to this see COBS 10.4. 
98  COBS 10.3.1R.  The client must also be warned if the required information is not supplied that a 
decision as to appropriateness will not be possible COBS 10.3.2R. 
99  COBS 10.2.2R. 
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A further rule100 which has some potential of giving rise to a tort claim is the ‘best 
execution’ rule found in COBS 11.  This applies to ‘execution only’ dealings in non 
complex products, ie those where the decision to trade and what to trade is made by the 
client in the absence of any advice.  Because the operation of COBS 10 is confined to 
‘complex’ financial instruments, such as derivatives, this is the only rule which applies to 
the recent development of online investment platforms without advisory services being 
offered by retail banks.101  Clients who purchase shares, or other ‘non complex’ financial 
products, in this way are in a ‘caveat emptor’ situation as long as the ‘best execution’ 
criterion is satisfied. 
The obligation owed by a firm in such a case is contained in COBS 11.2.1R.  It is that:  
A firm must take all reasonable steps to obtain, when executing orders, the best 
possible result for its clients taking into account the execution factors. 
 
It is clearly established that: ‘the duty of best execution has to do with the mechanics of 
acquiring or selling securities, not the merits or otherwise of the trade.’102  It thus only 
concerns obtaining the best terms (eg the price) for the customer and says nothing 
about the suitability of the investment for that person’s needs.  Subject to this proviso, 
COBS 11.2.6R details the factors which are relevant to determining whether the ‘best 
execution’ standard has been achieved.  They are: the characteristics of the client 
including the categorisation of the client as retail or professional; the characteristics of 
the client order; the characteristics of financial instruments that are the subject of that 
order and the characteristics of the execution venues to which that order can be 
directed.  Client categorisation is particularly important here as there are examples 
recorded of banks attempting to exclude this obligation by use of contractual terms 
which deem the relationship to be one between two principals rather than between 
professional and client.103  COBS 11.2.7R makes explicit provision that it is the total cost 
of a deal to a client (ie the price of the investment and the costs of executing the deal) 
which are to be considered in relation to the best execution criterion. 
 
Causation and remoteness of damage 
 
Section 138D(2) expressly make proof of damage an essential element in the cause of 
action which it creates for breach of a Handbook rule.  Standard notions of causation 
therefore apply to the statutory tort.  Thus in Zaki v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd104  it was 
held that some unsuitable investments had been made and that a breach of COBS 
9.2.1R had been established.  However, the Court of Appeal held that the client, who 
was a high net worth individual, was taking a bullish approach to the market and was 
determined to invest.  On the balance of probabilities, the burden of proof being on the 
claimant to prove that reliance had been placed on the recommendation, he would still 
have made the investments had he been correctly advised that they were unsuitable. A 
classic ‘but for’ approach to factual causation thus excluded liability for an established 
breach. 
 
Rubenstein v HSBC bank plc105 raised a classic issue of remoteness of damage: to what 
extent does a professional obligation to a client raise a duty to protect that client from 
market movements?  In that case the client had lost a significant sum of money on an 
investment at the time of the 2008 crash.  The decision of the Court of Appeal was that 
                                                                
100  Implementing Article 21(1) of MiFID and Article 25(2) first sentence of the UCITS implementing 
Directive. 
101  See ante n 67. 
102  Första AP-fonden v Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV [2013] EWHC 3127 (Comm) para 274, per Blair J. 
103  Crestsign Ltd v National Westminster bank PLC [2014] EWHC 3043, para 57. 
104  [2013] EWCA Civ 14, para 99. 
105  [2013] PNLR 9. 
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this sum was recoverable.  The limits of this decision need to be appreciated.  The case 
does not decide that a strict liability tort attracts a more generous regime of remoteness 
of damage.  Indeed, the successful claim was based both on the statute and in 
negligence.  The result, in line with that of the House of Lords in South Australia Asset 
Management Corp v York Montague Ltd,106 was driven by the nature of the adviser’s 
obligation.  The client’s stated desire for an investment equivalent to cash, motivated as 
it was by the fact that the money in issue represented the proceeds of a house sale 
which was intended to be invested in another property, meant that the client did not 
want to be exposed to the market.  The defendant’s breach resulted in the money being 
held in investments which exposed the client to market movements.  The losses suffered 
as a result of the crash were thus of the very kind which the defendant was obliged to 
protect the client against. 
The relationship of s 138D(2) to negligence 
 
Because of the ‘private person’ threshold and limitations within the FCA rules many 
cases brought against investment advisers or banks are pleaded in negligence.  In 
addition, private claimants may plead the torts in the alternative.  It is therefore 
necessary to consider how the statutory scheme relates to contractual and tortious 
duties to take reasonable care. 
 
Duty of care issues 
 
The two torts exist independently of each other.  However, it does not follow that the 
statutory tort is irrelevant to negligence claims. 
 
The first question is whether negligence can fill gaps in the statutory protection.  This is 
of particular importance for several reasons.  First the private person threshold locks 
businesses out of the protection offered by the statutory tort.  For a business the only 
cause of action will be in negligence.  Secondly, because the extension to the limitation 
period enacted by s 14A of the Limitation Act 1980 only applies to claims brought in 
negligence and not to the statutory cause of action.  As the value of an investment, such 
as a pension, may not be considered by an investor for some time after purchase, the 
non-availability of a secondary limitation period running from the date of the claimant’s 
knowledge of damage may be an important reason for claiming in negligence. 
The majority of cases in this area assume, without discussion, that the existence of and 
restrictions applicable to the statutory tort do not impact on a claim brought in 
negligence.107  The leading English case is Gorham v British Telecommunications plc.108  
There the defendant pleaded that, as the then wording of s 62A of the Financial Services 
Act 1986109 blocked the claimant from claiming under the statutory tort, there could be 
no claim in negligence.  This argument was rejected.  Pill LJ stated that ‘the silence of 
the codes on the subject of the rights of beneficiaries does not exclude the power of the 
court to consider whether a duty of care exists.’110  It follows directly from Gorham that 
a negligence claim will not be barred simply because the claimant is outside the 
definition of ‘private person’ under the ROA regulations.111  There is thus an alternative 
common law cause of action available to businesses which is not subject to those 
restrictions.  This is important because the Handbook imposes a significant number of 
                                                                
106  [1997] AC 191. 
107  Camerata Property Inc v Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd [2012] EWHC 7; Crestsign Ltd v National 
Westminster Bank PLC [2014] EWHC 3043. 
108  [2000] 1 WLR 2129. 
109  That wording made it a precondition that the claimant was a ‘private investor.’  The claimant was the 
spouse of the investor and beneficiary of the pension rights at issue. 
110  See also the industrial injury case of Bux v Slough Metals Ltd [1973] 1 WLR 1358. 
111  Ante p xx. 
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rules on advisers dealing with businesses.  These rules may well supply content as to 
what a reasonable adviser should do when dealing with a non-private person. 
However, Lord Hodge in the Outer House of the Court of Session in Grant Estates Ltd v 
Royal Bank of Scotland PLC,112 a case alleging that a bank has mis-sold an interest rate 
swap, adopted a radically different approach which effectively held that the constraints 
placed by Parliament on the statutory tort created a policy limitation on any duty of care. 
I do not think that GEL can rely on the COBS rules to create a common law duty 
of care in relation to the provision of advice. A common law duty can arise from 
the existence of a statutory duty as part of the background circumstances; and 
the existence of a statutory duty may show that a particular risk should have 
been foreseen.  When the court assesses the effect of the statutory duty on the 
question whether it is just and equitable to impose a duty of care the primary 
consideration is, in my view, the policy of the statute.  Looking to the policy of 
the FSMA one discovers that it provides protection to consumers of financial 
services through a self-contained regulatory code and statutory remedies for 
breach of its rules. As I have said, it needs no fortification by the parallel creation 
of common law duties and remedies. Further, the existence of a duty in 
negligence for failure to comply with the COBS rules would circumvent the 
statutory restriction on the direct right of action... 
This statement is obiter.  The actual result in Grant Estates was based on a finding that 
express terms in the contract between the parties precluded the pursuer from basing a 
claim on either an implied contractual term or on negligence.  However, Lord Hodge’s 
approach does seem to conflict with Gorham.  Indeed, it may be questioned why duty of 
care methodology was invoked.  The facts of the case presented a standard example of 
advice given to a client in a precontractual situation.  It thus raised a standard issue of 
misrepresentation and of the Hedley Byrne v Heller duty and the extent to which such 
duties can be negatived by contractual terms.  Whereas it may appear logical to ask 
whether a novel duty of care should be recognised which extends beyond a statutory 
scheme, it makes much less sense to block a recognised head of duty of care to reflect 
limitations in a parallel statutory scheme.  On that basis, it is submitted that Gorham is 
correct: Grant is correct on its facts (because of the contractual terms) but the dictum 
on the tort duty is wrong.   
A different, but related, point was at issue in Green & Rowley v the Royal Bank of 
Scotland plc.113  In that case, the statutory duty in issue was the positive one to provide 
information114 which has no common law equivalent (the Hedley Byrne duty being 
limited to not providing misleading information).  In those circumstances the Court of 
Appeal roundly rejected a contention that breach of the statutory duty raised an 
equivalent common law one.  The form of a concurrent common law duty must therefore 
be one which the common law recognises before limits within the statutory scheme can 
be overcome by resort to negligence. That was the case in Gorham where the insurance 
company gave negligent advice about the claimant’s husband’s pension arrangements. 
 A successful claim in Green & Rowley would have taken the Hedley Byrne duty of care 
into a wholly new field (that of a positive obligation to provide information).  In the 
words of Tomlinson LJ: 
The existence of a statutory duty may give rise to a common law duty of care in 
circumstances where breach of the statutory duty is not actionable in private law.  
The more usual case is where in performance of a statutory duty a party … brings 
about a relationship between itself and another person such as is recognised to 
give rise to a duty of care owed to that person.  Again, the duties are not co-
                                                                
112 [2012] CSOH 133. 
113  [2013] EWCA Civ 1197. 
114  COB 2.1.3R and 5.4 3R. 
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extensive and the duty at common law does not arise by reason of the imposition 
of the statutory duty but arises out of the relationship so created.115  
 
‘Crystallising’ the standard of care 
 
There is widespread support for the argument that the content of the statutory duty  
‘crystallises or concretises’116  the common law one.  In short, it is a failure of reasonable 
skill and care to fail to comply with the requirements which the statute imposes on you 
(a reasonable person obeys the law).  As a result, the issues raised in a claim brought in 
negligence are likely to be identical to those raised in a statutory claim.  The provisions 
contained in the FCA Handbook determine what amounts to taking reasonable care of a 
client’s interests.  Rix LJ has stated this approach as follows: 
 
It would seem therefore that, at any rate in the context where the COB rules 
apply to investment advice provided to a private person, the applicable principles 
in contract and/or tort will be guided by the focus and purpose of the statutory 
provisions.117 
 
In Crestsign Ltd v National Westminster Bank PLC Deputy Judge Tim Kerr QC adopted a 
similar approach saying: 
I agree with the banks that the two sets of duties are not to be treated as co-
terminous and that breach of a COBS duty is not necessarily common law 
negligence. 
But it does not follow that breaches of COBS duties (not actionable as such at the 
suit of Crestsign) cannot also be negligent at common law. Nor is the content of 
the COBS duties wholly irrelevant in a common law claim brought by a person 
unable by statute to sue for breach of a COBS duty. The COBS duties are likely to 
be relevant to determining the standard of care required of a reasonably careful 
and skilled adviser, since a reasonably skilled and careful adviser would not fall 
short of the standard required to meet relevant regulatory requirements.118 
At times, this result is assumed without discussion.  Thus in O’Hare v Coutts & Co119 the 
statutory suitability standard is stated by Kerr J as defining a common law obligation to 
show reasonable skill and care. 
 
It is common ground that the contract included an implied duty, and the law of 
tort imposed an identical duty, to use reasonable skill and care when 
recommending investments.  In the financial context, this is often paraphrased by 
saying that the recommended investments must be ’suitable’. 
 
The Bolam principle 
                                                                
115  Ibid para 29. 
116  Terms first used by G Williams, ‘The Effect of Penal Legislation in the Law of Tort’ (1960) 23 MLR 233, 
234 in relation to the analogous area of industrial safety legislation in which torts based on negligence and 
breach of statutory duty used to coexist. 
117  Rubenstein v HSBC Bank plc [2013] PNLR 9, para 46.  See also Al Sulaiman v Credit Suisse Securities 
(Europe) Ltd [2013] EWHC 400, para 18 per Cooke J. 
118  [2014] EWHC 3043, paras 126-7.  See also para 146. ‘I resist the fallacious reasoning that because 
common law duties and COBS duties are not co-terminous, and because Crestsign is excluded from the class of 
persons able to sue for breach of COBS duties, the banks can owe no common law duty which happens to 
overlap with a COBS duty.’ 
119  [2016] EWHC 2224 (QB). 
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The role of negligence in this context inevitably raises the role of the Bolam principle120 
which tests professional conduct by the standards adopted by bodies of reasonable 
practitioners of the skill.   
The first thing to say is that a standard of accepted practice is a difficult concept to apply 
in relation to recommendations to purchase particular financial products.  It is possible 
that a responsible body of practitioners exists somewhere that would recommend 
virtually any product.  If this is correct, the test will operate in a way which will favour 
defendants.  For example, recent litigation on interest rate hedging products shows a 
widespread assumption within the industry that interest rates would rise in the post 
2008 period and that customers should buy protection against that risk.  Hindsight tells 
us that this view was seriously mistaken and that interest rates would fall to historically 
low levels.  However, it is difficult to see how an adviser could be held to have infringed 
Bolam by recommending that the client buy protection.  Indeed, all of the cases seem to 
rely on more technical failings (such as failures to spell out in detail the financial 
consequences of terminating such a contract if interest rates fell).  In short, the Bolam 
test is more likely to be appropriate in relation to more mechanical matters such as 
conducting a fact find on the client.   
A separate question is the extent to which the common law in relation to the giving of 
advice is abandoning the Bolam test.  It is well known that the Supreme Court decision 
in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board121 has changed the position in relation to 
advice given regarding risks created by medical treatment.  Lord Kerr there defined a 
doctor’s duty of reasonable care in relation to information as: ‘a duty … to take 
reasonable care to ensure that a patient is aware of material risks of injury that are 
inherent in treatment.’122  This is a duty free from any consideration of the different 
approaches of different groups of reasonable doctors.  ‘The test of materiality is whether, 
in the circumstances …, a reasonable person in the patient's position would be likely to 
attach significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the 
particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it.’123  The doctor’s role 
involves a dialogue with the patient in order to ensure that the position and the 
alternatives are understood.124 
The question is whether this approach, being based on principles of self determination, is 
confined to the medical context or is more widely applicable to situations of advisory 
work, particularly those concerning risks created by particular financial products.  
Expressed differently, does a development in the law concerning rights to determine 
what is done to a person’s body effect the explanation of risks when economic interests 
are at stake? 
While it is clear that the decision in Montgomery is expressed in terms which concern 
only medical practice, courts have begun to extend it further. In Baird v Hastings125 the 
Northern Ireland Court of Appeal expressly applied Montgomery in a claim against a 
solicitor asserting a negligent failure to advise clients as to the consequences of their 
failing to complete a sale of their property.  The court emphasised that the solicitor was 
bound to take reasonable care to ensure that the client understood the material legal 
risks created by the transaction. 
                                                                
120  Bolam v Friern HMC [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
121 [2015] AC 1430. 
122  Ibid para 82. 
123  Ibid para 87. 
124  Ibid para 90. 
125  [2015] NICA 22. 
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The most important decision in the financial services context is that of Kerr J in O’Hare v 
Coutts & Co126  The judge in that case emphasised the need for a dialogue between 
adviser and client and expressly refused to apply the Bolam approach.  However, he 
relied upon detailed rules127 in the FCA Handbook concerning the giving of information to 
a client as effectively leading to the same result as would have been achieved by 
Montgomery.  The judge argued that these rules lay down a detailed scheme for the 
provision of information to clients which is incompatible with Bolam: there was no room 
within the scheme for the recognition of different bodies of reasonable opinion.  The 
result is that the Handbook rules determine the question of what information is to be 
given to a client by a financial adviser irrespective of whether a claim is brought in 
negligence or for breach of the rules under s 138D(2).128  If this approach is followed it 
will represent an important development in professional negligence law in the investment 
advice area. 
Conclusion  
The s 138D(2) tort has spawned an important and distinctive area of professional 
liability, albeit one that seems to be of most importance to high net worth individuals. 
 One fears that the pensions freedoms introduced in recent years will give rise to a 
further body of claims alleging mis-selling.  The tort deserves to receive greater 
attention.  It plays an important consumer protection role both in itself and in influencing 
accepted practice and thus how negligence applies to investment advisers.   
The law on this subject is not user friendly.  A litigant in person will find it almost 
impossible to understand based, as it is, on the heavily amended FSMA and the complex 
FCA Handbook.  There appears to be little online guidance available.129  The Money 
Advice Service’s website has a section on mis-selling of investments which touches on 
suitability but concentrates on the remedies provided by the FOS and the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme.130  Indeed, it issues a guarded warning against the risks 
of litigation.  The law is problematic because the relationship between the concepts of 
‘private persons’ and ‘retail clients’ cannot be understood without a knowledge of the 
way in which MiFID was grafted onto domestic law.  For a business client, negligence 
remains the only real remedy.  However, the private client has a possibly bewildering 
choice between the statutory tort, negligence and resort to the Ombudsman.  There is 
also the possibility of the regulator removing the need for litigation by taking action 
which results in compensation being paid.  Given this complexity and the sums of money 
which may be involved it is not difficult to see why this area is regarded as a growth 
area of professional liability law. 
In terms of tort principle, this tort is one of a number of examples of statutory strict 
liability for pure economic loss.  It provides part of an overall picture of the recovery of 
financial losses in tort alongside the ‘economic’ torts (for intentionally inflicted loss) and 
negligence.  The picture is simply incomplete without this tort (and the similar one 
concerning breaches of competition law).131  The idea that tort baulks at the protection 
of financial interests is challenged by this tort.  It is noteworthy that s 138D(2) has its 
origins in the mid 1980s when the common law was restricting recovery of pure 
                                                                
126  [2016] EWHC 2224 (QB). 
127  The rules cited were COBS 2.2.1(1)R and 2.2.2(1)(b)R; 4.2.1(1)R; 9.2.1R, 9.2.2R, 9.2.3R and 9.2.6R. 
128  NB that this case is distinguishable from Green & Rowley (ante p xx) in that the negligence duty to 
provide advice was here based on an express contract.   
129  Although this position is alleviated to an extent by the fact that low value claims fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Financial Ombudsman Service which does provide high quality guidance for those 
considering complaining about the conduct of authorised firms. 
130  https://www.moneyadviceservice.org.uk/en/articles/financial-mis-selling-what-to-do-if-you-think-its-
affected-you#if-youve-been-mis-sold-a-financial-product. 
131  Ante, n 15. 
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economic loss in negligence at a time when the Thatcher government was liberalising 
financial markets and encouraging wider share ownership.  A second challenge presented 
by the tort is to the idea propagated by scholars that strict tortious liability is imposed on 
activities which entail extraordinary risk to others.132  Section 138D(2) shows that in 
modern law such liability can serve a consumer protection role133 alongside other 
contractually based strict liability remedies such as those concerning sale of goods.  This 
role is far removed from the creation of extraordinary risks. 
Given the extent to which the rules in the FCA’s Handbook are derived from EU 
Directives such as MiFID, the future form of the tort, given Brexit, is uncertain.  There 
are suggestions that the financial services industry will be looking for deregulation as a 
way forward if the city is excluded from the single market.  However, if this is the case, 
notions of equivalence may become important and may force continued compliance with 
EU standards.  It must be remembered that the basic form of this law was in place as 
domestic law before MiFID came into force.  It may also be thought unlikely that the 
government would be keen to be seen to be loosening controls on the obligations owed 
by the financial services industry to clients given the recent history of mis-selling and 
other financial scandals.  The likelihood is, therefore, that the s 138D(2) tort will survive 
and continue to grow in importance. 
 
 Keith Stanton, Professor of Law, University of Bristol.  I would like to thank Sandra Annette Booysen, 
Christopher Hare, Ken Oliphant and Holly Powley for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this 
piece.  The usual disclaimer applies. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
132  Fleming’s The Law of Torts (10th edn), C Sappideen and P Vines eds (2010) 380. 
133  As do the provisions of Part I of the Consumer Protection Act 1987.  
